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Recently, the Arctic has transformed from a peripheral region to an area of great interest, for instance
in terms of oil drilling. Nonetheless, no legal instrument has addressed the matter of accountability
for transfrontier oil pollution damage. This article accordingly evaluates whether the current legal
constructs, meaning State responsibility, international liability, civil liability regimes, and
multilateral environmental agreements, allow accountability to be established for transboundary
environmental harm resulting from hydrocarbon exploitation in the Arctic. It also examines whether
these constructions could serve as the basis for future legislative actions. This article treats these four
constructions as layers of accountability. After examining all of the layers in their current formulation,
this article asserts that the existing layers cannot establish accountability for transboundary
environmental damage in the Arctic, nor do they as such offer an effective way to regulate
accountability in the future. Therefore, the article concludes that the law of accountability necessitates
a new approach, such as a non-compliance mechanism or hybrid system combining elements of
multiple layers. Finally, the article calls for immediate legislative actions.
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1 Introduction
Blowout. Gusher. Wild well. Across the whole region, the natural systems shudder. Months to control it.
Years to get over it. Human lives changed by the hundreds of thousands. Effects that ripple across the
country, the hemisphere, the world. […] No amount of money enough. Beyond payable.1
As evidenced by the account of the Deepwater Horizon disaster,2 a drilling-related oil spill is always
devastating, even if it occurs in fairly temperate conditions and relatively close to shore. In terms of
* Outi Penttilä, Doctoral Candidate, University of Helsinki, outi.penttila@helsinki.fi.
1 C Safina, A Sea in Flames: The Deepwater Horizon Blowout (Crown Publishing Group, New York 2011) 4.
2 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, ‘Natural Resource Damage Assessment, Status Update for the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill’ (April 2012) <http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/sites/default/files/wp-
content/uploads/FINAL_NRDA_StatusUpdate_April2012.pdf> accessed 28 December 2017.
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Arctic oil drilling, however, these attributes are unlikely to be met. Due to its peripheral location, long
distances to the closest coastguard establishments, the fact that oil evaporates slowly in the cold, the
characteristic long and harsh winters, not to mention the fragile and unique environment, the region
faces a severe risk of environmental damage of the most disastrous and long-lasting kind in the event
of an accident.3 Yet, the exploitation of the hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic has already
commenced and its total cessation seems implausible despite the recent activities of certain Arctic
States.4 Although the likelihood of a large-scale accident is small, the consequences would be
catastrophic. The current legal regimes, namely the International Convention on Oil Pollution
Preparedness, Response and Co-Operation, the Agreement on Co-Operation on Marine Oil Pollution,
Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, or the Polar Code,5 do not regulate accountability for
pollution caused by offshore oil rigs, pipelines, or other production systems.6 Instead, they concern
the prevention and elimination of marine pollution by taking responsive actions should damage occur.7
Therefore, this article examines the changes in international law to enforce accountability for
transboundary environmental harm resulting from oil drilling in the Arctic.
The article presents a twofold aim: First, it examines the existing legal constructions on which
international accountability for transboundary harm could be based and systematises them. In order
to accomplish this task in a well-structured manner, it follows Jutta Brunneé’s conception of
accountability for environmental damage. She divides accountability into four layers: State
responsibility, State liability, civil liability regimes, and multilateral environmental agreements
3 M Byers, International Law and the Arctic (CUP, Cambridge 2013), 200; WWF Report, ‘Drilling for Oil in the Arctic:
Too Soon, Too Risky’, 1 December 2010, 7-8.
4 The former US President Barack Obama announced a ban on Arctic drilling during the final weeks of his presidency;
however, this ban has already been questioned by his successor, President Trump. See C Davenport, ‘Obama Bans Drilling
in Parts of the Atlantic and the Arctic’ The New York Times (20 December 2016); R Meyer, ‘Can Trump Reverse Obama's
Arctic-Drilling Ban?’ The Atlantic (21 December 2016). The oil companies have not admitted defeat. See R Milne, ‘Statoil
will not give up on exploration in Arctic’ Financial Times (30 October 2017).
5 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-Operation (adopted 30 November 1990,
entered into force 13 May 1995) 1891 UNTS (OPPC); Agreement on Co-Operation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness
and Response in the Arctic (adopted 15 May 2013, not in force); International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters
(adopted 15 May 2015, entered into force 1 January 2017) MEPC 68/21/Add.1 (Polar Code).
6 Byers (n 3) 210. Freestone notes that accountability for transboundary environmental harm remains uncovered even
though such disasters frequently occur (D Freestone, ‘Series Editor’s Preface’ in J Barboza, The Environment, Risk and
Liability in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston 2011), xiii). Interestingly, an international
convention regulating the liability for oil spills is a topic that traditionally emerges in the aftermath of an incident; however,
no conclusion has been reached (see J Allen, ‘A Global Oil Stain - Cleaning up International Conventions for Liability
and Compensation for Oil Exploration/Production’, (2011) 25 Australian & New Zealand Maritime Law Journal 90, 91.
7 OPPC (n 5) Preamble; Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (n
5) art 1; Polar Code (n 5) Part II-A, ch 1.
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(MEAs).8 Second, this article concentrates on whether these layers offer ways to proceed with
establishing a future accountability regime for transboundary environmental harm resulting from oil
exploration.
With regard to the applied terminology, the article understands the Arctic region to encompass the
Arctic Circle but including also “Iceland’s northern maritime zones”.9 Additionally, the article adopts
the term “accountability”, by which it refers to all four layers of environmental accountability, thus
encompassing State responsibility, international liability, civil liability, and MEAs.10 The
controversial terms “liability” and “responsibility” are used in the manner in which the International
Law Commission (ILC) has utilised them, denoting that “responsibility” only refers to State
responsibility and “liability” to State liability.11 Furthermore, the terms “transfrontier” and
“transboundary” are used interchangeably, like the terms “environmental damage” and
“environmental harm”.12 In terms of the “environment”, the article adopts a broad definition: it
extends from damage to natural resources, such as water, fauna, and flora, to property, landscape, and
environmental amenity.13
The division of layers as the elements of international accountability serves as the structure of the
article: it navigates through the different means of accountability, in the present article known as
layers. Part 2 addresses State responsibility, while part 3 proceeds with international liability. Part 4
discusses civil liability regimes, and the article introduces the relevant MEAs in part 5. In each of the
upcoming parts, the essentials of the legal regime at hand are examined and considerable attention is
paid to the de lege ferenda aspect of that regime.14 Finally, the article concludes by evaluating the
8 J Brunnée, ‘Of Sense and Sensibility: Reflections on International Liability Regimes as Tools for Environmental
Protection’ (2004) 53 ICLQ, 351, 351-352. For another analysis, see R Lefeber, Transboundary Environmental
Interference and the Origin of State Liability (Kluwer International Law, The Hague 1996) 13-17.
9 RL Johnstone, Offshore Oil and Gas Development in the Arctic under International Law: Risk and Responsibility (Brill,
Leiden/Boston, 2015), 8.
10 The term has been adopted for clarity’s sake: responsibility and liability refer to the first two layers, State responsibility
and international liability. These terms have been used in a certain context within the ILC projects, implying certain legal
connotations; hence the adoption of a completely new term.
11 In terms of the civil liability systems and MEAs, the terms are used in the form in which they can be found in the regime
in question. See e.g. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16
November 1994) 1833-1835 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS) arts 139 and 235.
12 There are fine distinctions between these concepts: “harm” usually refers to physical and “damage” to financial
consequences (Lefeber (n 8) 16).
13 P Sands and J Peel with A Fabra and R MacKenzie, Principles of International Environmental Law (3rd edn CUP,
Cambridge 2012) 706.
14 As Koskenniemi underlines, distinguishing the approaches of de lege lata and de lege ferenda in international law is
traditionally challenging. Thereby, an evaluation of the existing regimes coexists with the comments on the future
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successfulness of the existing regimes to meet the challenge posed by transfrontier environmental
damage (part 6).
2 Layer 1 – State Responsibility
2.1 State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts and Its Relationship to Natural
Resources
The ILC’s project on State responsibility culminated in the acceptance of the Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) in 2001.15 The final
codification enjoys wide-spread acceptance,16 and it incorporates the ubiquitous principle that
“[e]very internationally wrongful act of the States entails the international responsibility of that
State”.17 Article 2, respectively, encompasses the idea that an internationally wrongful act of a State
exists when certain conduct, either act or omission, is both attributable to that State and constitutes a
breach of its international obligation. The criteria laid out in article 2 comprise the two main elements
of State responsibility as understood in the ARSIWA.18 However, some confusion persists in terms of
whether or not circumstances precluding wrongfulness constitute an additional element.19
Pursuant to article 2, responsibility is only triggered by a breach of an obligation, meaning that the
acts or omissions entailing responsibility must be deemed illegal. Utilisation of offshore natural
resources, however, is in principle legal: a State has permanent sovereignty over its natural resources,
including a duty not to cause harm to others.20 Therefore, a State is free to exploit the resources under
prospects of the regimes to establish accountability for oil pollution. This approach increases the effect of the researcher’s
personal views and the chosen angle, in this case environmental, on the final results. M Koskenniemi, ‘Valtion
kansainvälinen vastuu yksityisen toiminnan aiheuttamasta kansainvälisestä ympäristövahingosta’ (1982) Ympäristöalan
tutkielmia 1, 13.
15 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 53rd Session’ (23 April-1 June and 1 July-10
August 2001) UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), paras. 76 (ARSIWA); para. 77 (Commentary).
16 J Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (CUP, Cambridge 2013) 87-88.
17 The principle has been applied in multiple cases: see e.g. Phosphates in Morocco (Preliminary Objections) [1938] PCIJ
Series A/B No 74 10, 28; Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 23.
18 ARSIWA with commentaries (n 15) 34; B Stern, ‘The Elements of an Internationally Wrongful Act’ in J Crawford, A
Pellet, S Olleson (eds), K Parlett (asst ed), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP, New York 2010) 201; Crawford
(n 16) 94.
19 ARSIWA (n 15) Chapter 5; also L Condorelli and K Kress, ‘The Rules of Attribution: General Considerations’ in J
Crawford, A Pellet, S Olleson (eds), K Parlett (asst ed), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP, New York 2010)
224. Cf. Stern (n 18) 217-218; Crawford (n 16) 274-321.
20 UNGA Res 423 (VI) (1950) (4 December 1950); UNGA Res 626 (VII) (21 December 1952); UNGA Res 837 (IX)
(1954) (14 December 1954); UNGA Res 1314 (XIII) (1958) (12 December 1958); UNGA Res 1515 (XV) (1960) (15
December 1960); Trail Smelter arbitration (United States v. Canada) (1941) 3 RIAA 1907; Declaration of the United
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its jurisdiction in a manner it chooses appropriate. In terms of ownership of marine resources, the legal
framework applicable to their utilisation can be found in the UNCLOS.21 As the exploitation of natural
resources constitutes a legal activity, nothing in the present law of State responsibility prohibits
employing that right over one’s natural resources as such. This constitutes a problem when examining
the relationship between responsibility and exploitation of natural resources: industrial production,
agriculture, and traffic almost unavoidably result in harm to the environment but to ensure the well-
being of humankind, these industrial activities are considered necessary.22
Moreover, should the exploitation of natural resources contain a risk of hazardous consequences, it is
traditionally subject to a licensing system. Quite naturally, oil drilling constitutes an illustration of this
practice.23 Most of the Arctic States have enacted sufficient safety provisions when allowing drilling
activities, despite one prominent exception, Russia, whose “environmental protection record leaves
much to be desired”.24 It is still difficult to imagine drilling activities being undertaken without the
State in question being familiar with the extractive operation and even promoting it.
2.2 The Elements of State Responsibility – Attribution and a Breach of an Obligation in
Relation to Environmental Activities
The question of attribution is the first condition of State responsibility, regulated by the second chapter
of the ARSIWA. It traces back to the dilemma that no State can act by itself; instead, the States always
act through individuals, physical persons.25 The respective articles postulate that conduct, including
omissions, carried out by an organ of a State always constitutes an act of the State regardless of its
nature and the position and character of the State organ.26 Additionally, the ARSIWA affirms that the
conduct of an organ that has been empowered by the internal law to exercise governmental authority
shall be considered as an act of the State, thus encompassing State responsibility for parastatal entities
or formerly State-owned companies exercising governmental authority in place of State organs.27 The
Nations Conference on the Human Environment (5-16 June 1972) UN Doc.A/CONF/48/14/REV.1, Principle 21;
Declaration of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (3-14 June 1992), UN Doc.A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1,
Principle 2.
21 UNCLOS (n 11) arts 2; 3; 56; 76; 77; 136; 137; Annex II, art 4.
22 Koskenniemi (n 14) 47.
23 Ibid, 130-131.
24 Byers (n 3) 200-208.
25 ARSIWA with commentaries (n 15) 40.
26 ARSIWA (n 15) art 4; ARSIWA with commentaries (n 15) 40-41.
27 ARSIWA (n 15) art 5; ARSIWA with commentaries (n 15) 42-43.
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bodies included in “organs” in the sense of the ARSIWA may vary from each other radically, ranging
even to private companies. Certain criteria must still be fulfilled: the private company must be
empowered through legislation to exercise functions that normally only belong to State organs due to
their public character. The conduct that triggers State responsibility must also be linked to the exercise
of governmental authority.28
Generally, international law acknowledges that acts or omissions undertaken by private individuals
are not attributable to States,29 which hinders the utility of State responsibility in the context of Arctic
oil drilling. Due to the growing interest in the decentralisation and consequent privatisation of
formerly State-owned entities during the last few decades, the companies engaged in potentially
harmful activities are usually private.30 This also applies to the enterprises active in the Arctic region.31
Despite being prima facie private, the ARSIWA provides that the conduct is attributable to a State if
a) it is controlled and directed by a State (article 8) or b) carried out by an organ of a State (article 4),
or c) the private entity undertaking the conduct exercises governmental authority (article 5).32
Proving attribution, however, is difficult. Article 8 necessitates a direct governmental agency
relationship between the private entity and the State while the State in question must deliver specific
directions or exercise explicit control over the private entity.33 In general, even the conduct of a State-
owned and State-controlled entity is not attributable to the State.34 Attribution is therefore only
possible under exceptional conditions: it warrants explicit control and direction on the part of the
State.35 Indeed, the level of control required from entities acting on State instructions almost parallels
the effective control of a State,36 and the effective control test adopted by the international tribunals
28 ARSIWA with commentaries (n 15) 43. The commentary exemplifies such private activities: they i.e. include private
security firms’ acts when acting as prison guards or private-owned airlines’ acts when controlling immigration (ibid).
29 Ibid, 47.
30 A Kiss and D Shelton, ‘Strict Liability in International Environmental Law’ in TM Ndiaye and R Wolfrum (eds), Law
of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes: liber amicorum Judge Thomas A. Mensah (Martinus Nijhoff,
Leiden/Boston 2007) 1140.
31 Johnstone (n 9) 195-196. However, as Johnstone points out, a State may still be held responsible for private actions if it
has failed to meet its primary obligations (ibid, 197-198). In the present article, this is addressed more in detail infra.
32 ARSIWA (n 15) arts 4; 5; 8. For the priority of these rules, see L Guruswamy, ‘State Responsibility in Promoting
Environmental Corporate Accountability’ (2010) 21 Fordham Environmental Law Review 209, 213.
33 ARSIWA with commentaries (n 15) 47; Guruswamy (n 32) 214.
34 ARSIWA with commentaries (n 15) 48. For more of the so-called “corporate veil”, see e.g. Johnstone (n 9) 195-196.
35 International courts have tested effective control in multiple cases: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, paras. 109, 115. Cf. Tadic Case
(Judgement) ICTY-94-1 (26 January 2000), para. 117. Also Guruswamy (n 32) 214.
36 R McCorquodale and P Simons, ‘Responsibility beyond Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by
Corporations of International Human Rights Law’ (2007) 70 Modern Law Review 598, 609-610.
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almost precludes attributing the conduct of a private individual to a State as such control over a private
entity is only rarely exercised.37 An additional hindrance follows from the environmental context. As
mentioned, oil drilling is traditionally regarded as a hazardous activity and thus subject to a licensing
system.38 Therefore, the question of whether the mere existence of such a system equates with
effective control over drilling activity should be examined. Given the stringent threshold of
international tribunals,39 this remains unlikely. A State could also be deemed responsible for actions
undertaken by private individuals pursuant to articles 4 and 5, especially in the context of human rights
violations. According to this argument, the acceptance of certain duties imposes an obligation on the
governmental authorities to ensure compliance with those duties. The primary obligations referred to
must be detailed and specific.40 International environmental law, however, is characterised by a lack
of such primary norms,41 a matter that diminishes the relevance of articles 4 and 5 in the Arctic context.
In addition to attribution, the ARSIWA also codified rules on breaches of international obligations.42
These breaches consist of two elements, material and temporal.43 A material breach of an obligation
exists “when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation,
regardless of its origin or character”.44 The obligation may derive from any legal source and its content
may differ,45 neither does it necessitate the existence of fault.46 The material breach of an obligation
is best demonstrated through a case-by-case analysis of a definite primary rule of international law,
denoting that the precise formulation and meaning of the obligation in question should be enlarged on
carefully.47 In a temporary sense, the breach of an obligation necessitates that the chronological
relationship between the act or omission and the existence of its breach is assessed.48 For a breach of
an obligation to entail responsibility, the ARSIWA warrants that the State must be bound by the
37 Ibid.
38 Byers (n 3) 200-208.
39 E.g. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (n 35) paras. 109, 115; Tadic Case (n 35) para. 117.
40 Guruswamy (n 32) 215.
41 Ibid, 215-216; M Fitzmaurice, ‘International Responsibility and Liability’ in D Bodansky, J Brunnée and E Hey (eds),
The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (OUP, Oxford 2007) 1017.
42 ARSIWA (n 15) Chapter III.
43 Crawford (n 16) 215.
44 ARSIWA (n 15) art 12.
45 ARSIWA with commentaries (n 15) 55-56.
46 Stern (n 18) 209-210.
47 Crawford (n 16) 215-216.
48 Ibid, 240.
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obligation at the time of the breach’s occurrence.49 The ARSIWA also regulates the extension in time
of the breach of an international obligation and composite acts.50
In order to examine whether a breach of an obligation exists in an environmental context, the primary
environmental obligations should be known. Yet, the current state of international environmental law
challenges the utility of State responsibility in an environmental context. First, the environmental
documents define the term “environment” incoherently. Second, many of the core obligations of
environmental law, such as the no harm rule, precautionary principle, or sustainable development, are
vague and contested. Third, the clarifying jurisprudence in the field is scant.51 In terms of the relevant
obligations, it must also be emphasised that a State may be held responsible for not only its acts but
also for its omissions, should it fail to act diligently.52 The due diligence rule is significant to State
responsibility for the actions of private entities,53 especially in relation to the duty not to cause harm.54
As the commentary to the ARSIWA postulates, the rules of attribution “have a cumulative effect, such
that a State may be responsible for the effects of the conduct of private parties, if it failed to take
necessary measures to prevent those effects”.55 In this regard, a diligent State is required to undertake
positive measures to prevent environmental damage and punish those responsible for it. A failure to
fulfil these obligations may entail State responsibility.56
Even though the emerging environmental obligations or the obligation of due diligence could serve
as the basis for responsibility-related claims against the sponsoring State, the effectiveness of such
claims in front of international tribunals is subject to some controversy. The precautionary principle,
for instance, has been invoked by the parties in multiple cases; yet the tribunals long hesitated to
declare its status.57 Additionally, as States are recognised as the primary subjects of international law,
49 ARSIWA (n 15) art 13.
50 Ibid, arts 14-15.
51 Fitzmaurice (n 41) 1017; Brunnée (n 8) 354; C Nègre, ‘Responsibility and International Environmental Law’ in J
Crawford, A Pellet, S Olleson (eds), K Parlett (asst ed), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP, New York 2010)
805. For an assessment of the relevant obligations and their utility in the context of Arctic oil pollution damage, see O
Penttilä, Transboundary Environmental Harm in the Arctic: A Study of Accountability for an Oil Spill (Master’s thesis,
2015) 29-48.
52 Johnstone (n 9) 197-198.
53 R Pisillo-Mazzeschi, ‘The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International Responsibility of States’ (1992) 35
GYBIL 9, 40.
54 Johnstone (n 9) 244-245.
55 ARSIWA with commentaries (n 15) 39.
56 Pisillo-Mazzeschi (n 53) 40-41.
57 For the practice of e.g. the International Court of Justice, see e.g. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)
[1997] ICJ Rep 7, para. 97; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) (Judgement) [2010] ICJ Rep 14,
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the litigation processes can only be initiated by other States. Considering that States have
demonstrated certain hesitancy in filing environmentally-focused complaints,58 it seems rather
optimistic to expect that States would file complaints pertaining to either other States’ acts or failures
to act. As a consequence, the utility of State responsibility in establishing accountability for the
transboundary environmental harm in the Arctic remains contested.
2.3 Does State Responsibility Constitute an Effective Tool When Establishing Accountability
for Transfrontier Harm?
Apart from attribution and establishing the breach of an obligation, the regime of State responsibility
faces other difficulties in enforcing accountability: pursuant to international law, only States are
entitled to bring responsibility-related claims. States, however, have not been eager to initiate
proceedings against other States, arguably fearing to expose themselves to future claims and
disadvantageous rulings.59 Moreover, it is difficult to present claims for accountability for the damage
caused to the global commons in accordance with the rules of State responsibility. A State has only
limited means to pursue claims in cases where it is not the injured party, directly affected by the
damage; in other words, a State can effectively pursue only its own standing.60 Finally, the regime of
State responsibility enforces the international standards of environmental protection insufficiently,
which has led to the creation of treaty-based compliance methods.61 The rationale behind the
shortcomings of the regime of State responsibility to cover environmental damage can be traced to
the reluctance of States to be objects of moral condemnation. State responsibility necessitates a
moralistic judgement relating to the act or omission behind the harm, a fact the sovereign States have
naturally accepted only cautiously.62 Responsibility is still not totally devoid of importance in
environmental issues as it may be the only available means to enforce customary norms. The
alternative methods, such as civil liability regimes, might also prove inadequate in upholding
accountability due to their own characteristics; thus, retaining the option of recourse through
para. 164. Cf. ‘Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the
Area’ (No 17) (Advisory Opinion, 1 February 2011) ITLOS Reports 2011, 10, para. 127.
58 P Sands, ‘The Environment, Community and International Law’ (1989) 30 Harvard International Law Journal 393, 407.
See also Sands’ account of the State practice after the Chernobyl disaster. Even though a few States reserved a right to
bring damage-related claims against the Soviet Union, no lawsuits were filed (ibid, 405-406).
59 Ibid.
60 Fitzmaurice (n 51) 1017-1018; 1020-1022. See also Johnstone (n 9) 213-225.
61 P Birnie, A Boyle and C Redgewell, International Law and the Environment (3rd edn OUP, Oxford 2009) 237.
62 Koskenniemi (n 14) 46-47.
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international proceedings is necessary.63 This means that the regime of State responsibility is
characterised by both benefits and drawbacks. In the case of oil drilling in the Arctic, it presents an
option to enforce accountability for environmental harm although certain factors hinder its utility.
3 Layer 2 – State Liability64
3.1 The ILC’s Project on International Liability and Its Successors – The Principles on
Allocation of Loss
Early in the preparation of the ARSIWA, the challenges relating to the utility of State responsibility
in an environmental context were recognised; consequently, the ILC separated the project of liability
for lawful acts from the State responsibility project in 1978.65 The work on International Liability for
Injurious Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law was characterised by challenges
right from its beginning, and the division acquired a reputation as one of the most contentious topics
of international law.66 Similar cautiousness marked States’ attitude towards the project. The core
challenge, it appears, was the question of whether States could be held strictly liable for transfrontier
damage, a matter only cautiously accepted by States.67 Unsurprisingly, the drafting history of
international liability in the ILC became a time-consuming exercise, resulting finally in the
subdivision of the topic into works on prevention and reparation.68 The former was concluded in 2001
63 Birnie et al (n 61) 237.
64 Contrary to State responsibility, State liability addresses accountability for lawful activities that are risk-intensive. Thus,
no breach of an international obligation is necessitated. See Brunnée (n 8) 352.
65 The division was reasoned by claiming that State responsibility was meant to cover breaches of secondary rules whereas
international liability supposedly concentrated on primary rules and obligations. Additionally, the legality of the act or
omission was a central reason for the division. Finally, it was argued that ‘[a] joint examination of the two subjects could
only make both of them more difficult to grasp’. ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its
31st Session’ (14 May-3 August 1979) UN Doc. A/34/10, para. 60. For discussion, see M Fitzmaurice, ‘International
Environmental Law as a Special Field’ (1994) 25 NYIL 181, 205.
66 Many scholars were critical towards the division: e.g. A Boyle, ‘State Responsibility and International Liability for
Injurious Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law: A Necessary Distinction?’ (1990) 39 ICLQ, 1, 22;
PM Dupuy, ‘The International Law of State Responsibility: Revolution or Evolution?’ (1989) 11 MichJIntlL 105, 113;
Fitzmaurice (n 65) 203, 205-206; MB Akehurst, ‘International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts
Not Prohibited by International Law’ (1985) 16 NYIL 3, 9. Others have deemed the work more promising: e.g. G Handl,
‘Liability as an Obligation Established by a Primary Rule of International Law’ (1985) 16 NYIL 49, 79; DB Magraw,
‘Transboundary Harm: the International Law Commission's Study of "International Liability"’ (1986) 80 AJIL 305, 317-
318; Lefeber (n 8) 226.
67 For the other elements of international liability, see Lefeber (n 8) 148-157.
68 Prevention and reparation were always elements of the project. See ILC, ‘Third report on international liability for
injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law’ (23 June 1982) UN Doc A/CN.4/360, para.
9.
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when the Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities were
adopted,69 while the latter, more contentious project was almost abandoned by the ILC, to be resumed
only after a direct request from the General Assembly.70 After reintroducing the topic, the ILC
concluded its work on reparation rapidly, presumably thanks to abandoning the previous focus on
strict State liability.71
After restating the matter in the ILC’s agenda in 2002, the final version of the Draft Principles on
Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities was
adopted in 2006.72 These Principles apply to transfrontier damage resulting from hazardous activities
not prohibited by international law.73 They are supplementary to both the ARSIWA and the Draft
Articles on Prevention. In the latter case, however, they indicate that if the State has complied with
the obligation of prevention, no liability can be triggered.74 The Principles necessitate that damage
inflicted on persons, property or the environment must be significant. The elements of damage include
the loss or damage caused by the impairment of the environment, the costs relating to reasonable
measures of reinstatement of the environment, and the costs of reasonable response measures.75 The
objectives of the Principles are twofold: they aim at ensuring prompt and adequate compensation for
the victims while aspiring to preserve and protect the environment.76
In terms of compensation, the Principles establish a requirement for each State to take the necessary
measures to ensure prompt and adequate compensation.77 They also address the channelling of
liability: the adopted measures “should include the imposition of liability on the operator or, where
appropriate, other person or entity”.78 In this regard, the Principles are based on the operator’s
69 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission’ (n 15) para. 97 (Draft Articles on Prevention).
70 UNGA Res 56/82 (12 December 2001); also A Boyle, ‘Liability for Acts Not Prohibited by International Law’ in J
Crawford, A Pellet, S Olleson (eds), K Parlett (asst ed), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP, New York 2010)
97.
71 A Boyle, ‘Globalising Environmental Liability: The Interplay of National and International Law’ (2005) 17 Journal of
Environmental Law 3, 6.
72 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 58th Session’ (1 May-9 June and 3 July-11 August
2006) UN Doc. A/61/10, para. 66 (Principles on Allocation of Loss); para. 67 (Commentary).
73 The scope of the Principles on Allocation of Loss mirrors the scope of the ILC’s work on prevention of transboundary
harm. See ILC, ‘Second report on the legal regime for allocation of loss in case of transboundary harm arising out of
hazardous activities’ (15 March 2004) UN Doc. A/CN.4/540, para. 36(2).
74 Kiss and Shelton (n 30) 1138.
75 Principles on Allocation of Loss (n 72) principle 2(a)(iii)-(v).
76 Principles on Allocation of Loss (n 72) principle 3; Principles on Allocation of Loss with commentary (n 72) 140-150.
77 Principles on Allocation of Loss (n 72) principle 4(1).
78 Ibid, principle 4(2).
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liability,79 and the operator is defined as the entity that uses, controls or directs, the activity.80
Furthermore, liability should not be subject to requesting proof of fault.81 The Principles also allow
exonerations from liability and impose an obligation on the operators to maintain insurance or other
financial security. In the event the victims still are not compensated adequately, the State of origin
should guarantee access to additional financial remedies.82
The Principles additionally govern the law of response measures and offer guidance on domestic and
international remedies.83 In other words, they seek to ensure that States notify other States about the
effects of transboundary damage and regulate cooperation and sharing of information, as well as the
obligation to take all the necessary measures to extenuate and eliminate the effects of the damage.84
States need to maintain a sufficient level of allowance to their judicial and administrative bodies to
ensure the availability of effective, prompt and adequate remedies in the event of transboundary
damage. The access to justice and information must be granted equally to all victims of transfrontier
harm.85 Furthermore, States should promote the conclusion of additional regional agreements when
possible, taking into account the participation of the relevant industry in providing supplementary
funds for compensation.86 States should also adopt legislative, regulatory and administrative measures
and promote cooperation in law-making.87
3.2 Are the Principles on Allocation of Loss an Adequate Measure when Regulating
Accountability for Oil Spills in the Arctic?
The Principles on Allocation of Loss embody a range of general principles that are codified in a soft
law document. Despite the adoption of this document, however, accountability for transboundary
harm remains insufficiently regulated. First, this originates from the unsatisfying, soft law formulation
of the Principles as the finalised Principles adopt the wording of “should” instead of “shall”.88 The
79 Principles on Allocation of Loss with commentary (n 72) 154-155.
80 Principles on Allocation of Loss (n 72) principle 2(g).
81 Ibid, principle 4(2).
82 Ibid (n 72) principles 4(2)-4(5).
83 Ibid, principles 5-6. The initial formulation of principles 5 and 6 gained severe criticism due to the chosen wording:
they were set out in soft law terms, a solution that was perceived inappropriate. Hence, the final wording was praised (see
Boyle (n 71) 18-19; Boyle (n 70) 97; 100).
84 Draft Principles on Allocation of Loss (n 72) principle 5.
85 Ibid, principle 6.
86 Ibid, principle 7.
87 Ibid, principle 8.
88 Ibid, principles 4; 5(c); 5(e); 6(2); 7; 8. Even this is an improvement: in its earliest forms, the entire project was drafted
in the form of “should” (Boyle (n 70) 100-101; Barboza (n 6) 160). See also Special Rapporteur Rao’s reply to the
13
ILC perceived it a major asset because, thanks to the adopted approach, the Principles do not
necessitate the harmonisation of domestic systems. Arguably, the formulation also promotes their
more widespread acceptance.89 Second, the Principles are based on the assumption of civil liability of
an operator rather than State liability. In other words, States should ensure prompt and adequate
compensation for the victims of transboundary damage through establishing strict liability for the
operator of a hazardous activity or, where appropriate, to another person or entity.90 This feature
certainly fulfils the elements of a civil liability system.91 Indeed, the ILC seems to perceive State
responsibility and civil liability as “potentially complementary regimes”92 and claims that any future
work on the issue of liability should be devoted to developing civil liability regimes.93 As such, the
Principles do not establish liability for the States in inter-State relationships, unless the State in
question is the operator of the hazardous activity.94 The growing willingness to privatise formerly
State-run industry areas, however, further minimises the chances for this, and establishing strict State
liability for actions undertaken by private operators remains as questionable as ever.95
Even though promoting civil liability regimes that at least in some cases are an effective tool for
combatting transfrontier damage is a respectable goal, the main anxiety still remains. When shifting
the focus of the project on international liability from inter-State strict liability to operator-based civil
liability, the ILC watered down the original purpose of international liability. The shift is
understandable as establishing State liability faced such difficulties that its completion without
altering its focus was improbable.96 Yet, hazardous activities are traditionally subject to licensing
systems and thus the sponsoring State is well aware of the risks the activity contains. Due to State
sovereignty, it even enjoys the capacity of regulating such an activity. Hence, providing an opportunity
to outsource accountability to private actors may promote States’ willingness to engage in hazardous
criticism, ILC, ‘Third report on the legal regime for allocation of loss in case of transboundary harm arising out of
hazardous activities’ (7 March 2006) UN Doc. A/CN.4/566, 85-86.
89 Principles on Allocation of Loss with commentary (n 72) 113-114. Ultimately, the relevance of the form of the draft
principles must also be scrutinised: should the draft principles have been codified as draft articles, they still would have
been a soft law document. Thus, any improvement in the current situation would have been controversial.
90 Principles on Allocation of Loss (n 72), principle 4(2); 4(5).
91 Boyle (n 70) 99; Fitzmaurice (n 41) 1032.
92 Boyle (n 70) 99.
93 ILC, ‘First report on the legal regime for allocation of loss in case of transboundary harm arising out of hazardous
activities’ (18 March 1998) UN Doc. A/CN.4/487, para. 114. See also Johnstone (n 9) 263-264 (arguing that a failure to
complete such regimes could, at least theoretically, entail State responsibility); cf. Penttilä (n 51) 91.
94 Principles on Allocation of Loss with commentary (n 72) 140.
95 Kiss and Shelton (n 30) 1140.
96 For the Special Rapporteurs’ difficulties, see Lefeber (n 8) 189-219.
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activities. Therefore, the aspiration to shy away from State liability appears questionable, especially
when considered from the perspective of the environment.97
In terms of the feasibility of the Principles in the context of Arctic oil spills, similar issues must be
considered. As they only comprise a non-binding soft law document, the Principles do not offer a
workable solution for establishing accountability for transboundary harm. Even if binding, they would
only establish an initiative to create civil liability regimes.98 Thus, the remains of the ILC’s ambitious
project on international liability do not seem relevant in terms of Arctic hydrocarbon exploitation.
4 Layer 3 – Civil Liability
4.1 Civil Liability Regimes in International Law – Ship-Source Oil Pollution Damage System
as an Example
When the ILC finalised its work on international liability, it corroborated that any future development
of environmental accountability should be based on a civil liability regime. Moreover, the general
support for civil liability regimes may be derived from the accelerating number of adopted civil
liability conventions,99 even though some of them have not entered nor are expected to enter into
force.100 As general systems, civil liability regimes most often regulate accountability for specific,
ultra-hazardous activities, such as the liability for ship-source oil pollution or nuclear activities,101 and
the regimes endeavour to channel liability and costs to the owners or operators of the high-risk
activities instead of States.102 Usually, they recognise the competence of the national courts, either in
97 The question of whether strict State liability for transboundary environmental damage is a concept worth adopting has
stimulated robust scholarly work: for those advocating it, see e.g. C O’Keefe, ‘Transboundary Pollution and the Strict
Liability Issue: The Work of the International Law Commission on the Topic of International Liability for Injurious
Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law’ (1989-1990) 18 Denver Journal of International
Law and Policy 145, 154. For those opposing it, see e.g. Magraw (n 66) 327.
98 See infra, part 4.
99 Sands and Peel (n 13) 737-738.
100 The most disheartening example is the ambitious Lugano Convention (Convention on Civil Liability for Damage
Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment (adopted 21 June 1993, not in force) 32 ILM 1228 (1993)).
101 Sands and Peel (n 13) 738; Brunnée (n 8) 357. The nuclear activities are covered by conventions on the damage resulting
from the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the operation of nuclear ships. See Convention on Third Party Liability in the
Field of Nuclear Energy (adopted 29 July 1960, entered into force 1 April 1968, amended by the Additional Protocol of
28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982) 956 UNTS 251; Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage (adopted 21 May 1963, entered into force 12 November 1977, amended by the Protocol of 29 September
1997) 1063 UNTS 265; Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships (adopted 25 May 1962, not in force).
This section will, however, focus on the ship-source oil pollution damage system as an example of the civil liability
systems.
102 Brunnée (n 8) 352.
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the State of origin of the polluter or in the State where the damage was caused, to decide the liability-
related claims and establish that these decisions are enforceable in other State Parties.103 The existing
regimes, such as the traditionally formulated ship-source oil pollution damage system, usually contain
the following elements: the definitions of the applicable terminology, the provisions about the adopted
standard of care (usually strict), the channelling of liability, the determination of the maximum
liability, the possible exceptions of liability, the requirements in terms of insurances or other financial
securities, and the procedural rules pertaining to the recognition and enforcement of judgements.104
The ship-source oil pollution damage system comprises three supplementary treaties, namely the Civil
Liability Convention with subsequent Protocols,105 the Fund Convention,106 and the Bunker
Convention.107 The incentive for their adoption was the occurrence of large-scale environmental
catastrophes, such as the Torrey Canyon accident.108 The CLC, as did its first predecessor, rests on
the principle that no State will be held responsible for oil pollution damage; instead, the liability has
been channelled to the shipowners. The CLC is based on strict liability,109 and it requires the
shipowner to maintain insurance or other financial security for oil pollution damage unless the ship is
carrying less than 2,000 tons of oil in bulk as cargo.110 It is applicable to oil pollution that has been
caused in a State Party’s territory, including its territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone. In case
the State Party has not established such a zone, the CLC is applicable in a zone the State Party has
specifically determined for this purpose in accordance with the provisions of the CLC. The
Convention also applies to preventive measures, wherever taken, to prevent or minimize oil pollution
damage.111 The Convention defines pollution damage as loss or damage caused by the escape or
discharge of oil from a ship, “provided that compensation for impairment of the environment other
103 Fitzmaurice (n 41) 1024.
104 Sands and Peel (n 13) 738. For differences between the existing regimes, see A Rosas, ‘Issues of State Liability for
Transboundary Environmental Damage’ (1991) 60 Nordic Journal of International Law 29, 37-38.
105 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (adopted 29 November 1969, entered into force
19 June 1975) 973 UNTS 3 as amended by Protocol of 1992 to amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage (adopted 27 November 1992, entered into force 30 May 1996) UNTS 1956 (CLC).
106 The International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage (adopted 18 December 1971, entered into force 16 October 1978) 1110 UNTS 57, replaced by Protocol of 1992
to Amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage (adopted 27 November 1992, entered into force 30 May 1996) 1953 UNTS (Fund Convention).
107 International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage (adopted 23 March 2001, entered into
force 21 November 2008) 40 ILM 1493 (2001) (Bunker Convention).
108 Sands and Peel (n 13) 746.
109 CLC (n 105) art III.
110 Ibid, art VII.
111 Ibid, art II.
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than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited to costs of reasonable measures of
reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken”.112 The original text of the 1969 CLC did not
mention the impairment of the environment; this amendment was adopted while the 1992 CLC was
negotiated. Thus, the amended text indicates that damage to the environment falls within the scope of
the treaty.113 The liability of the owner is not absolute: the CLC acknowledges several exemptions
from liability.114 Moreover, a limitation of the maximum liability on the basis of an amount calculated
with the assistance of the tonnage of the vessel is adopted.115
The reason the Fund Convention with its amendments was subscribed to was the failure of the CLC
to satisfactorily regulate all the legal and financial aspects that were discussed while adopting the
CLC.116 The main goal of the Fund Convention is to provide an additional source of compensation for
the victims; therefore, it offers compensation to only those victims of pollution damage whose claims
for compensation have been addressed inadequately on the basis of the CLC system.117 The Fund
Convention also aims to convey part of the financial risk and consequences of damage to the owner
of the cargo, not only to the owner of the vessel.118 The Bunker Convention, respectively, was adopted
to enforce civil liability for bunker-related oil leaks. It mostly replicates the principles and
compromises of the CLC, imposing the strict liability for oil pollution damage to the owner of the
bunker and acknowledging similar exonerations of liability.119 The Convention defines pollution
damage accordingly, restricting compensation for environmental damage to “reasonable measures of
reinstatement”.120 Moreover, the owner of a ship whose capacity exceeds 1,000 tons is expected to
maintain insurance or other financial security to cover the liability.121
As a whole, the ship-source oil pollution damage system has been described as a relative success in
tackling ship-source oil pollution.122 The majority of the claims made under the civil liability system
112 Ibid, art I(6)(a).
113 Sands and Peel (n 13) 747.
114 CLC (n 105) art III(2)(a).
115 Ibid, art VI(1).
116 G Doeker and T Gehring, ‘Private or International Liability for Transnational Environmental Damage - the Precedent
of Conventional Liability Regimes’ (1990) 2 Journal of Environmental Law 1, 5.
117 Fund Convention (n 106) arts 2(1)(a); 4(2)-4(4).
118 Sands and Peel (n 13) 748.
119 Bunker Convention (n 107) arts 3(1); 4.
120 Ibid, art 1(9)(a).
121 Ibid, art 7.
122 Brunnée (n 8) 366.
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have been met promptly and without resorting to further national litigation processes. Additionally,
92 to 95 percent of the relevant shipping nations have accessed the system, even though this excludes
a number of relevant players, such as the United States. Even these States, however, have
acknowledged the importance of the issue and have often concluded national legislation regulating
ship-source oil pollution.123
4.2 Is a Civil Liability Regime Feasible in Terms of Establishing Accountability for the
Utilisation of Hydrocarbon Resources?
The idea of a civil liability system for oil drilling is not novel, as regulative actions already exist in
other geographical areas, such as the North Sea. There, the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources
regulates civil liability for damage resulting from offshore drilling activities.124 Its similarities with
the ship-source pollution damage system are striking: it establishes strict liability on the operator of
the installation, reiterates the rules governing the exceptions of liability, and limits the liability.125 The
treaty, however, never entered into force, most probably due to its article 15, which allows States to
freely determine the liability limits and thus creates an avenue for forum shopping. In other words,
the latitude granted to States could result in altering the maximum liability to gain economic
advantage, resulting in continuous turmoil in the regulation of oil drilling.126
To ensure maximum participation, a civil liability regime for the Arctic hydrocarbon activities would
best be concluded on the basis of the existent systems and contain the traditional elements already
listed:127 the applicable terminology, the channelling liability, the standard of care, the possible
exonerations and limitations of liability, the requirement of financial security, and the procedural
elements. Its geographical scope should also be determined. The more traditional the system, the better
123 Birnie et al (n 61) 438-439.
124 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed
Mineral Resources (adopted 1 May 1977, not in force) 16 ILM 1450 (1977). The current signatories include Germany,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Belgium and France have not signed the Convention.
Should the Convention enter into force in the future, its article 18 stipulates that the Parties could invite more States to
join the regime but these States would need to “have coastlines on the North Sea, the Baltic Sea or that part of the Atlantic
Ocean to the north of 360 North latitude”.
125 Ibid, arts 3; 6; 7.
126 M Gavouneli, Pollution from Offshore Installations (Graham&Trotman, London 1995) 118-119.
127 See supra section 4.1.
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prospects it would enjoy in terms of entering into force.128 Thereby, a civil liability regime applicable
to Arctic oil drilling could be welcomed, as it would assist in establishing accountability for oil
pollution damage. Given the current political atmosphere, concluding such an agreement is more
probable than establishing strict State liability.
Yet, even civil liability regimes incorporate challenges as the ship-source oil pollution damage regime
demonstrates: First, these regimes always allow limiting and exonerating liability, meaning that the
operators never compensate the damages fully.129 This is the most precarious side of such a regime.
The partial compensation together with the exonerations allows the operators of a hazardous activity
to benefit from not having to bear the full monetary consequences of possible damage, which can even
be deemed a state subsidy to the hazardous activity.130 Second, the scope of the civil liability regimes
is traditionally narrow in terms of covered activities and territorial application, meaning, for instance,
that the damage that occurs beyond the exclusive economic zone is often left uncompensated.131 This
is undesirable in the Arctic context as an oil spill may result in the destruction of the Area. Despite
these downsides, however, civil liability systems could provide an avenue for the future law-making
activities: considering the insistence of the international community on civil liability rather than State
liability and the positive experiences in regulating accountability for ship-source oil pollution damage,
a regime based on them appears the most realistic way to improve accountability for environmental
damage.
128 The most traditionally built regimes are accepted more easily: e.g. the Bunker Convention, which reiterates much of
the CLC, was adopted in 2001 and entered into force in 2008. The ambitious Lugano Convention, instead, has acquired
no ratifications.
129 Koskenniemi (n 14) 26-27. Considering that the civil liability schemes are based on financial securities granted by
insurance companies, this is understandable: an unlimited financial burden would mean that no enterprise could offer the
respective insurances.
130 Byers (n 3) 211. The international community would truly invest its funds more effectively if such subsidies were
granted to developing renewable energy instead of aiding a branch of industry that not only may cause serious damage but
also contributes to climate change.
131 Koskenniemi (n 14) 26.
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5 Layer 4 – Multilateral Environmental Agreements
5.1 MEAs Regulating Liability
The MEAs seeking to establish accountability can be divided into those agreements that establish
strict State liability for damage and those that include references to, or provisions of, liability.132 In
the context of the former, only one eminent exception, the Liability for Damage Convention,133
establishes strict State liability. The Convention regulates liability for damage caused by space objects
and pursuant to it, the launching State is “absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused
by its space object either on the surface of the earth or to an aircraft in flight”.134 The Convention is a
unique treaty, mainly because its negotiation process was vastly influenced by all the most prominent
States engaged in celestial activities.135 Its negotiations were antedated by the conclusion of the Outer
Space Treaty;136 consequently, the Liability for Damage Convention is often perceived as a further
elaboration of the principles codified in the previous treaty.137 Pursuant to the Convention, the damage
is defined as “loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to
property of States or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of international intergovernmental
organizations”.138 Notably, environmental harm as a compensable form of damage is not included;
yet it has still been argued that the Convention allows such claims, interpreting “property of States”
to include both the natural resources and environmental assets of a State.139 The aim of the
compensation is to restore circumstances as if the harm never occurred.140 The Convention is based
132 As mentioned, the layer-based construction of the article originates from Brunnée’s article. The earlier sections have
followed her perception slavishly. Yet, in this section, there are notable differences: the article treats the Liability for
Damage Convention in this context, even though Brunnée pays no attention to it. This is surprising as the Convention is
regularly included in the relevant MEAs in the literature (e.g. Doeker and Gehring (n 116) 12-14; Kiss and Shelton (n 30)
1135-1136). An additional difference pays tribute to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, on which Brunnée’s assessment of the fourth layer is founded. The Convention
is not treated in the current section as it concentrates on imposing strict liability on the operators of the waste-related
transports. In other words, the Basel Convention is a civil liability convention, and even Brunnée admits it (Brunnée (n 8)
360).
133 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (adopted 29 March 1972, entered into force
1 September 1972) 961 UNTS 187 (Liability for Damage Convention).
134 Ibid, art II. For exceptions, see arts VI and VII.
135 Doeker and Gehring (n 116) 13.
136 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon
and other Celestial Bodies (adopted 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967) 610 UNTS 205 (Outer Space
Treaty).
137 Kiss and Shelton (n 30) 1136.
138 Liability for Damage Convention (n 133) art I(a).
139 Sands and Peel (n 13) 728; Rosas (n 104) 41.
140 Liability for Damage Convention (n 133) art XII.
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on strict State liability while it channels liability to the launching State instead of the operator.141 It
also includes exonerations from liability: States are allowed to depart from strict liability if the harm
is a result of gross negligence or an intentional act or omission conducted by the claimant. In case the
launching State has violated its international obligations and this violation has resulted in damage, no
exonerations are available.142
In addition to the Liability for Damage Convention, multiple MEAs either refer to liability indirectly
or contain provisions relating to it, of which this article focuses on three examples, namely the
UNCLOS, the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) and the proposed Arctic Treaty. The UNCLOS mainly
concerns other topics; however, it also encompasses provisions on accountability. Article 235 imposes
no additional rules on liability for environmental damage but refers to the existing rules of
international law, stipulating that responsibility and liability shall be defined in accordance with
international law.143 The Convention also includes a special notion of liability for deep sea-bed
activities. Pursuant to article 139, States are responsible for ensuring that activities undertaken in the
Area are conducted in conformity with the rules of the UNCLOS that regulate the principles governing
the Area. Moreover, the damage resulting from a failure to carry out the responsibilities of a State or
an organisation triggers the liability of that actor.144 Yet, the applicability of article 139 is limited.
First, it only applies to activities conducted in the Area, i.e. beyond the continental shelf of a State.
This excludes liability for damage arising from activities undertaken in the vicinity of the shore.
Second, a State is not liable for damage caused by an entity it has sponsored if the State “has taken all
necessary and appropriate measures to secure effective compliance”.145 Indeed, the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has emphasised that no strict State liability is enforceable on the basis
of the UNCLOS, noting that the “liability for damage of the sponsoring State arises only from its
failure to meet its obligation of due diligence”.146 Thus, the UNCLOS only effectuates a general
framework of liability instead of enforcing accountability for transboundary environmental damage;
141 Ibid, art II.
142 Liability for Damage Convention (n 133) art VI.
143 For instance, Rosas categorises the UNCLOS to treaties adopting no special liability regime (Rosas (n 104) 32).
144 UNCLOS (n 11) art 139(2).
145 Ibid.
146 ITLOS Advisory Opinion (n 57), para. 189.
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neither can it serve as the basis for establishing strict State liability. Yet, article 235(3) still encourages
State parties to regulate the question of international accountability.147
Additional liability-related measures can be found in the ATS, a regime that has been effectual in
regulating the activities in Antarctica. Within the ATS, liability is addressed in the CRAMRA and the
Environmental Protocol’s Annex VI.148 As the former never entered into force, mainly due to its
stringent signature provision,149 the main instrument for liability is Annex VI to the Environmental
Protocol. In many aspects, Annex VI replicates the CRAMRA,150 seeking to govern Antarctic
environmental emergencies relating to scientific research, tourism or other governmental or non-
governmental use of the area.151 The liability regime consists of both operator and State liability.152
An operator is responsible for undertaking effective and prompt measures to tackle environmental
emergencies relating to its activities as well as bearing the costs of such measures,153 and
environmental emergencies refer to accidental incidents that have resulted or threaten to result in a
significant and harmful impact on the Antarctic environment.154 Furthermore, Annex VI distinguishes
liability between a State actor and non-governmental body, limiting the liability of a non-
governmental operator to “as much as possible the costs of the response action that should have been
taken”.155 The standard of care is strict;156 however, Annex VI allows exceptions to the liability.157 As
for State liability, Annex VI mainly provides no further substantive rules on the matter,158 while
excepting direct State responsibility for the activities of private operators from its purview.159 In other
147 IMO Legal Comm., Information Relating to Liability and Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from
Offshore Oil Exploration and Exploitation, 98th Sess., Agenda Item 13, Doc. No. LEG 98/13 (18 February 2011).
148 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (adopted 2 June 1988, not in force) 27 ILM
868 (1988) (CRAMRA); Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (adopted 4 October 1991, entered
into force 14 January 1998) 2941 UNTS; Annex VI to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty,
Liability Arising from Environmental Emergencies (17 June 2005, not in force) 45 ILM 5 761 (Annex VI).
149 CRAMRA (n 148) art 62.
150 However, it has been criticised as less stringent in terms of environmental protection (see R Wolfrum, ‘Liability for
Environmental Damage in Antarctica: Supplement to the Rules on State Responsibility or a Lost Opportunity?’ in I
Buffard and G Hafner (eds), International Law between Universalism and Fragmentation: Festschrift in Honour of
Gerhard Hafner (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Leiden/Boston 2008) 817-818). Considering that the difficulties the
CRAMRA faced were attributed to the insufficient level of environmental protection, this seems ironic.
151 Annex VI (n 148) art 1.
152 Ibid, arts 6; 10. The operator may be governmental or non-governmental (art 2(c)).
153 Ibid, art 6(2)(b).
154 Ibid, art 2(b).
155 Ibid, art 6(2).
156 Ibid, art 6(3).
157 Ibid, arts 8-9.
158 Ibid, art 10. Also Sands and Peel (n 13) 734; Wolfrum (n 150) 822.
159 Wolfrum (n 150) 822.
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words, Annex VI is incapable of enforcing subsidiary State liability in the case that the operator is
unwilling or incapable of achieving its obligations.160 However, State responsibility for the
insufficient implementation of the obligations regulated in Annex VI is not affected.161
Finally, the much advocated, yet almost utopian idea of an Arctic treaty could assist in regulating
accountability. Academically, proposals on behalf of an Arctic treaty have been frequent; indeed, in
terms of the Arctic cooperation, there are few issues that have gained similar attention as the need for
a comprehensive treaty system applicable to the Arctic region.162 Even though the regulative need has
been acknowledged, the possible basis of the system remains controversial.163 The creation of a totally
new instrument applicable to Arctic cooperation has been widely advocated.164 Most scholars argue
that such an agreement should take the form of a framework convention, which would facilitate the
deepening of the cooperation through additional protocols, including one for accountability.165 Were
the framework convention negotiated, it should respect the already existing sovereign rights, settle the
overlapping sovereignty claims in the Arctic, define the guiding principles, determine the
geographical applicability of the treaty, and allow wide participation.166 Yet, no consensus over the
exact content of the treaty exists and a more moderate convention built on the Arctic Council’s legacy
has also been promoted.167 The need for a more coherent regulative framework, applicable to the
Arctic cooperation has been widely recognised academically; however, in spite of the almost
unanimous academic support,168 no intergovernmental initiatives exist. Conversely, the five Arctic
coastal States voiced firm opposition to such initiatives, claiming that the UNCLOS forms the primary
160 Sands and Peel (n 13) 734.
161 Wolfrum (n 150) 822.
162 See T Koivurova and DL Vanderzwaag, ‘The Arctic Council at 10 Years: Retrospect and Prospects’ (2007) 40
University of British Columbia Law Review 121.
163 The proponents can be divided into four groups: those believing in the ATS-based regime, those supporting an
UNCLOS-based system, those trusting that other instruments could model for the proposed treaty regime, and those
advocating a new system. The first two categories have just been introduced and the last is addressed now. For an analysis
of the third, see e.g. KN Casper, ‘Oil and Gas Development in the Arctic: Softening of Ice Demands Hardening of
International Law’ (2009) 49 National Resources Journal 825.
164 T Koivurova, ‘Alternatives for an Arctic Treaty – Evaluation and a New Proposal’ (2008) 17 RECIEL 14, 26; D
Rothwell, ‘The Arctic in International Affairs: Time for a New Regime?’ (2008-2009) 15 Brown Journal of World Affairs
241, 248-250; HH Hertell, ‘Arctic Melt: The Tipping Point for an Arctic Treaty’ (2008-2009) 21 Georgetown International
Environmental Law Review 565, 586-589; Byers (n 3) 213.
165 Koivurova (n 164) 26; Rothwell (n 164) 249-250; Hertell (n 164) 586-589. Cf., Byers (n 3) 213.
166 Rothwell (n 164) 249-250; Hertell (n 164) 587; Koivurova (n 164) 24.
167 Koivurova (n 164) 24. For alternatives, see Rothwell (n 164) 250; Hertell (n 164) 589; Byers (n 3) 213.
168 E.g. Casper (n 163) 880; Koivurova (n 164) 26; Rothwell (n 164) 249-250.
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means for future cooperation.169 Therefore, an Arctic treaty in the foreseeable future appears an
unlikely prospect.
5.2 Could an MEA Solve Accountability for Drilling-Related Oil Pollution Damage?
The Liability for Damage Convention initially constitutes a perfect model of a treaty establishing strict
liability for hazardous activities resulting in transboundary damage. Arguably, it allows claims based
on environmentally related damage while it provides strict State liability. It has even been extensively
claimed that States have accepted the strict liability regime for environmental damage on the basis of
it.170 Yet, no generalisations in relation to strict liability should be made: the Convention has a peculiar
drafting history, being concluded during the Cold War and supported by both the United States and
Soviet Union. Additionally, none of the countries engaged in space activities was keen to include
celestial activities in the arms race due to their highly sensitive military nature.171 Space activities
were considered to affect State security and military interests, not economic well-being or
environmental protection, which considerably increased the ability to agree on strict liability.172 The
growing interest in diminishing oil reserves hardly generates a shared understanding of the
significance of strict State liability for oil pollution damage. Thus, this Convention is not a convenient
precedent for accountability in relation to Arctic hydrocarbon activities.
Neither do the three other alternatives referring to accountability provide sufficient sources for its
establishment. First, even though the idea of the UNCLOS as a basis for accountability for
environmental harm has gained both support and criticism,173 it merely generates an obligation to
create liability regimes. No accountability for Arctic oil drilling may be enforced by applying its
liability provisions, and opening these provisions for renewal seems improbable.
Second, the ATS with its newest addition, Annex VI, arguably contains several promising elements
in terms of accountability for oil drilling-related transboundary harm. It establishes strict liability,
169 Ilulissat Declaration, 28 May 2008, Arctic Ocean Conference Ilulissat, Greenland, 27-29 May 2008.
170 G Handl, ‘State Liability for Accidental Transnational Environmental Damage by Private Persons’ (1980) 74 AJIL
525, 529.
171 Doeker and Gehring (n 116) 13-14.
172 Ibid.
173 For support, e.g. H Corell, ‘Reflections on the Possibilities and Limitations of a Binding Legal Regime’ (2007) 37
Environmental Policy and Law 321, 321-322; C Emmett and J Stuhltrager, ‘After the Ice Melts: The Need for a New
Arctic Agreement’ (2011-2012) 26 Natural Resources & Environment 33, 36; Ilulissat Declaration (n 169). For criticism,
see Rothwell (n 164) 248-249; Casper (n 163) 880.
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even for purely environmental harm, and determines damage broadly. It has also been praised for its
effective governance of activities in the South Pole.174 Considering that the two Poles share many
similarities, such as harsh climatic conditions, a fragile environment, and accessibility-related
challenges,175 a similar system also appears practical in the Arctic. Yet, the ATS entails significant
challenges as the liability-related instruments have faced difficulties in terms of entry into force.176
Moreover, the conditions of the two Poles are still different: the Arctic Ocean is a sea surrounded by
continents whereas the Antarctic is a continent surrounded by an ocean. Consequently, sovereign
States have long been present in the Arctic. The region has also been subjected to military presence,
to which the Antarctic has never been exposed.177 Additionally, the ATS was initiated long before the
commercial exploitation activities in the Antarctic area commenced or even seemed commercially
viable.178 Therefore, a treaty system replicating the approach adopted in the ATS seems improbable.
Third, the Arctic treaty remains moot in terms of establishing accountability for hydrocarbon-related
environmental harm, mainly because such an international instrument has not been created despite the
academic effort promoting it. Were a regional framework agreement created, it remains uncertain
whether it would regulate the liability for transboundary environmental damage and thus provide the
essential tools for establishing international accountability. Noting the difficulties the ATS has faced,
an effortless negotiation of an agreement relating to accountability in the Arctic context would
constitute a major surprise. Thus, neither do the multilateral environmental treaties provide an
effective tool for enforcing the international accountability for a transboundary oil spill.
6 Conclusions
The present article indicates that each of the layers of accountability remains a prisoner of its own
limits, meaning that international law does not currently allow an effective establishment of
accountability for transboundary environmental damage. Therefore, “a new way” is needed. In the
174 MA Verhaag, ‘It Is Not Too Late: The Need for a Comprehensive International Treaty to Protect the Arctic
Environment’ (2002-2003) 15 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 555, 578. For a more hesitant view,
L Nowlan, Arctic Legal Regime for Environmental Protection (IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 44, 2001)
66.
175 Verhaag (n 174) 578.
176 Neither the CRAMRA nor Annex VI has entered into force.
177 Koivurova (n 164) 21; Hertell (n 164) 583-585.
178 R Wolfrum, The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (Springer-Verlag, Berlin 1991)
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literature, multiple propositions exist, ranging from compliance mechanisms that would prevent harm
from occurring in the first place,179 to more flexible non-compliance mechanisms similar to the non-
compliance procedure of the Montreal Protocol.180 Yet it is not entirely certain whether flexibility can
and indeed should play a fundamental role when determining international accountability. Even
though the compliance mechanisms may promote obedience to treaty commitments, their highly
political and diplomatic nature also entails drawbacks, possibly increasing the influence of those who
wield the political power in case the rule of law fails.181
While none of the layers alone provides an effective solution, albeit some are more promising than
the others, the problem at hand could be solved through a hybrid system incorporating the best
elements of the existing systems. For instance, the system could essentially be a civil liability system
supplemented by monetary State participation. Yet, the proposed regime faces a dilemma. It should
be based on an innovative and flexible approach to the issue of accountability while a more
conventional regime building on the accepted elements of accountability is more likely to enter into
force.
What then could trigger the drafting of a regime establishing international accountability for oil
pollution damage resulting from oil drilling activities? Based on previous experiences, there are two
alternatives: either creating a regime in the aftermath of a major environmental disaster, as happened
in the ship-source oil pollution damage, or creating a workable system when environmental matters
have become a concern of a security and military nature, as evidenced by the Liability for Damage
Convention. Neither of these opportunities, however, appears tempting in the Arctic context. Allowing
a transfrontier incident to occur before initiating the drafting activities, especially when the need for
regulative measures has long been acknowledged, is irresponsible. Additionally, States’ willingness
to promote solutions for military and security threats far exceeds their readiness to tackle the
sovereignty-related matters of accountability for environmental damage. The disadvantage is that
179 Fitzmaurice (n 41) 1035.
180 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (adopted 16 September 1987, entered into force 1
January 1989) 1522 UNTS 3; Nègre (n 51) 808-811. The non-compliance procedures provide an alternative mechanism
to address the issue of non-compliance with treaty provisions and disputes over non-compliance, complemented by
innovative institutional mechanisms. Thus, they occupy “a function between conciliation and traditional dispute
settlement”. See Sands and Peel (n 13) 161-162.
181 J Klabbers, ‘Compliance Procedures’ in D Bodansky, J Brunnée and E Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of
International Environmental Law (OUP, Oxford 2007) 1008.
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when the environmental concerns exacerbate into security or military concerns, the effective reaction
to them might no longer be possible. Therefore, the time for action is now.
